Tully Accuses FBI Agents of Suppression, Destruction, Tampering and Perjury in Raniere Prosecution

Agree w the other comment that it would seem that FR has turned in to a KR PR stunt. I’ll eat my hat if any of these rule 33s amount to anything much less Keith’s conviction overturned and a new trial granted. It’s all just smoke and mirrors.

Another Hollyweird star in Pedophilia.
Keep your kids away from Comic Book Stars

The Flash Ezra Miller Situation Takes another Insane Twist with Cult like Behavior & More

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Keith Raniere,
Plaintiff,
v.
Merrick Garland, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV 22-00212-TUC-RCC
ORDER
Plaintiff Keith Raniere, who is confined in the United States Penitentiary-
Tucson (USP-Tucson) and is represented by counsel, filed a civil rights Complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and paid the filing and administrative fees. He then filed a
First Amended Complaint (Doc. 3) and a Motion for Leave to Serve Complaint on
Governmental Defendants (Doc. 4). The Court will order Defendants to answer the First
Amended Complaint and will deny as moot the Motion for Leave to Serve.
I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief
against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity,
regardless of whether the prisoner is represented by counsel. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a); In re
Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997) (“District courts are required
to screen all civil cases brought by prisoners, regardless of whether the inmate paid the full
filing fee, is a pauper, is pro se, or is represented by counsel, as [§ 1915A] does not
differentiate between civil actions brought by prisoners.”). The Court must dismiss a

complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or
malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2).
A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does
not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for
relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual
allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there
are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681.
II. First Amended Complaint
In his three-count First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff sues the following
Defendants in their official capacities: United States Attorney General Merrick Garland,
Bureau of Prisons Director Michael Carvajal, USP-Tucson Warden Barbara Von
Blanckensee, and Lieutenant Anthony Gallion. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive
relief to enjoin prison officials from retaliating and “actively frustrating and impeding his
First and Sixth Amendment rights to access to the courts and counsel,” and his attorney’s
fees and costs.
Plaintiff alleges he is serving a 120-year prison sentence for, among other things,
child sexual exploitation and possession of child pornography. Plaintiff alleges that during

– 2 –

May 2021 visit with an individual (Chakravorty) who is both Plaintiff’s power-of
attorney and Plaintiff’s criminal defense attorney’s paralegal, the visit was terminated and
Chakravorty’s visitation privileges were permanently revoked by Defendant Von
Blanckensee.
Plaintiff claims that for the five-month period preceding April 28, 2022, Plaintiff’s
attorneys had weekly calls with Plaintiff, without any interference. Plaintiff alleges that
on April 28, Plaintiff’s criminal defense attorney filed a motion to stay an appeal in the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals because he intended to file a motion for new trial in the
district court based on newly discovered evidence, in the form of three expert’s reports
concluding the FBI had falsified and tampered with evidence and federal agents had
committed perjury relevant to Plaintiff’s child pornography and sexual exploitation
convictions. On May 3, 2022, Plaintiff’s criminal defense attorney filed the motion for
new trial in the district court. Plaintiff contends his criminal defense attorney anticipates
that the district court will conduct a hearing on the motion and that Plaintiff is best poised
to assist him in preparing for the hearing because Plaintiff has first-hand knowledge of the
criminal allegations against him.
Plaintiff alleges that on May 4, 2022, the day after his criminal defense attorney
filed the motion for new trial, he was on a privileged legal call with the criminal defense
attorney, and the call was terminated prematurely, without warning. Shortly thereafter,
Plaintiff was instructed to go to an administrative office, where Defendant Gallion asked
Plaintiff about certain individuals who were on Plaintiff’s approved telephone and
visitation list. Plaintiff contends many of the individuals were attorneys or “attorney’s
agents,” such as Chakravorty.
1
Plaintiff claims Defendant Gallion “made the affirmative
decision to ‘scrub’ Plaintiff’s approved callers and visitors list” and told Plaintiff that his
list was being scrubbed, he would have to apply to a unit manager to have anyone re

_______________________________________

1 Plaintiff claims he can only communicate with Chakravorty if he is on Plaintiff’s
approved list of callers. He alleges his conversations with Chakravorty are recorded and
monitored by prison officials and are not treated as confidential, even though Chakravorty
is an agent of Plaintiff’s criminal defense attorney.

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approved, and it was unlikely Chakravorty would be approved. Plaintiff asserts that when
he asked Defendant Gallion why this was being done, Defendant Gallion only told him that
“there was an investigation.” Plaintiff alleges that on May 6, Defendants “interfered and
frustrated” a confidential legal call between Plaintiff and an attorney by “causing the phone
call to be cut off” before Plaintiff and the attorney had concluded the conversation.
Plaintiff asserts Defendant Von Blanckensee affirmatively decided to interfere with
Plaintiff’s First and Sixth Amendment rights by terminating Plaintiff’s telephone calls with
his defense attorney and removing Chakravorty from Plaintiff’s approved telephone and
visitation list. He claims Defendant Von Blanckensee was the moving force behind
Defendant Gallion’s actions, the events on May 4 and 6, and the prior denial of
Chakravorty’s ability to visit. He alleges Defendant Carvajal is aware that federal prison
wardens retaliate against individual prisoners based on personal animus, unrelated to any
legitimate penological purpose; failed to prevent this kind of retaliation; “affirmatively
carried out th[is] policy”; and “perpetuated the policy and practice” by allowing wardens
to engage in this type of retaliation. Similarly, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Garland
“affirmatively maintained the policy of allowing Wardens to retaliate” based on personal
animus unsupported by a legitimate penological purpose.
In Count One, Plaintiff alleges his First Amendment right of access to the courts
includes “a reasonable opportunity to communicate in a contemporaneous manner with his
lawyers.” He contends Defendants frustrated and interfered with this right on May 4, 2022,
and “threatened to continue to frustrate and interfere” with this right by “effectively cutting
off Plaintiff’s ability to communicate by phone with his attorneys and their agents.”
Plaintiff seeks “reasonable access” to communicate with his attorneys and their agents in
person and “using contemporaneous telephonic methods,” subject to limitations that have
a reasonable relationship to legitimate penological interests. He asserts he will suffer
irreparable harm absent court intervention.
In Count Two, Plaintiff alleges he was subjected to retaliation for exercising his
First Amendment right of access to the courts. He contends that prior to May 3, 2022, he

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communicated with his criminal defense attorneys and their agents to assist them in
preparing a motion for new trial. Plaintiff asserts that less than a day later after his criminal
defense attorney filed the motion for new trial, Defendants substantially frustrated and
impeded Plaintiff’s ability to assist his criminal defense attorney when they “imminently
threaten[ed] to cut off all telephonic and in-person communication with his attorneys.” He
claims the short time between the filing of the motion and Defendants’ adverse action
“raises a substantial likelihood that Defendants[’] actions were retaliatory.”
In Count Three, Plaintiff alleges a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. He
asserts Defendants have deliberately interfered with the confidential relationship between
Plaintiff and his criminal defense attorney and this interference “substantially prejudices”
Plaintiff by preventing him from helping prepare his attorney for the hearing on the motion
and preventing his attorney from providing effective assistance of counsel.
The Court will require Defendants to answer Plaintiff’s access-to-the-courts,
retaliation, and Sixth Amendment claims.
III. Motion for Leave to Serve
Plaintiff seeks leave to serve his First Amended Complaint prior to the Court
screening it. Because the Court has screened the First Amended Complaint and is calling
for an answer by Defendants, the Court will deny as moot the Motion for Leave to Serve.
IT IS ORDERED:
(1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Serve Complaint on Governmental
Defendants (Doc. 4) is denied as moot.
(2) Plaintiff must serve each Defendant.
(3) If Plaintiff does not complete service of the Summons and First Amended
Complaint on a Defendant within 90 days of the filing of the Complaint or within 60 days
of the filing of this Order, whichever is later, the action may be dismissed as to each
Defendant not served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); LRCiv 16.2(b)(2)(B)(ii).

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(4) Defendants must answer the First Amended Complaint or otherwise respond
by appropriate motion within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Rule 12(a)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(5) Any answer or response must state the specific Defendant by name on whose
behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any answer, response, or other motion or paper that
does not identify the specific Defendant by name on whose behalf it is filed.
Dated this 17th day of May, 2022

__________________________________
Honorable Raner C. Collins
Senior United States District Judge