Clyne, Dr. Roberts, and Dr. Porter File Letters With Court in Civil Case – Saying They’re Broke and Have No Lawyer

“…in other legal proceedings that could occur in the future.” – Nicole Clyne. Ummm, you mean like visa fraud? Possession of illegal photographs and blackmail material?

“…currently hold over $600,000 in debt for my medical education and legal fees to defend it.” – Dr. Danielle Roberts. First, you aren’t a doctor anymore nor do you play one on tv. Second, if $600,000 in debt is what Executive Success looks like, I think I’ll pass.

“I have no money to hire a lawyer.” Brandon Porter. I find it hard to believe women aren’t lining up to pay you to show them videos of violence, rape, and live beheadings, all the while performing illegal mind experiments on them. It sounds like a hoot and you are just not trying hard enough, sir.

Danielle: I deny any participation in any of the charges or contribution to any damage the plaintiffs are claiming they experienced.

Judge: You deny it? Okay then, case dismissed!

Danielle: Thank you, Your Honor! By the way, what’s your favority ‘brand’ of pens, if I may ask…?

‘The two lawyers’ who are well versed in pig-latin are eager to help gratis and for free. Their knowledge of the law is both deep and wide-ranging, as repeatedly demonstrated in these pages.

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(When copying in, small deviations in formatting can and do occur. The content of the text is not affected and does not affect the
understanding of the text.)
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Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP FRIED FRANK
One New York Plaza
New York, New York 10004
Tel: +1.212.859.8000
Fax: +1.212.859.4000
http://www.friedfrank.com
Direct Line: 202.639.7040
Email: james.wareham@friedfrank.com
October 29, 2021
Via ECF
The Honorable Eric R. Komitee
United States District Court
Eastern District of New York
225 Cadman Plaza East
Brooklyn, NY 11201
Re: Edmondson, et al. v. Raniere, et al., 20-cv-00485-EK-CLP
Dear Judge Komitee:
We represent Ms. Sara Bronfman in the above-captioned action. We write in response to
the Court’s October 15, 2021 order directing the defendants to submit letters to the Court by
today’s date regarding proposed next steps in this action. (ECF 92). In accordance with the
Court’s instructions, as discussed on the record at the October 15, 2021 status conference, we
also address our proposed motion to dismiss the first amended complaint (the “FAC”) (ECF 64).
INTRODUCTION
Put simply, Ms. Sara Bronfman does not belong in this lawsuit. Upon a fair reading of
the FAC it is difficult to discern what possible claim any of the 84 plaintiffs might have against
Ms. Sara Bronfman. No plaintiff alleges that he or she was subjected to any abuse or harm by
Ms. Sara Bronfman. Indeed, the FAC — which represents plaintiffs’ second bite at the apple —
does not allege any facts suggesting that Ms. Sara Bronfman participated in, or even knew about,
the unfortunate (and, in some cases, heart-wrenching) abusive conduct perpetrated by certain
individuals associated with NXIVM.
Plaintiffs’ inability to allege any actionable conduct on the part of Ms. Sara Bronfman is
hardly surprising. After all — despite conducting an exhaustive investigation regarding NXIVM
and obtaining six convictions — the United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of
New York (the “Office”) did not prosecute or seek to indict Ms. Sara Bronfman. Indeed, to our
knowledge, Ms. Sara Bronfman was not even a subject of the Office’s investigation. That the
Office did not seek to prosecute Ms. Sara Bronfman is not mere happenstance. It reflects the fact
that the Office recognized what the individual plaintiffs and their attorneys surely know already:
that Ms. Sara Bronfman was not aware of, was not involved in, and bears no responsibility for,
the wrongdoing perpetrated by others associated with NXIVM.

The Honorable Eric Komitee October 29, 2021

Equally striking, in connection with the filing of their two complaints in this action,
counsel for plaintiffs have enjoyed unfettered access to each of their 84 clients and had the
opportunity to speak with, interview, and gather information from those 84 plaintiffs. Further,
we understand that plaintiffs’ counsel was in the unique position to attend the interviews the
Office conducted with a significant number of the plaintiffs. And yet — in the 21 months since
plaintiffs filed their initial complaint — plaintiffs remain incapable of lodging any factual
allegations in support of their claims against Ms. Sara Bronfman. Notably, after all of this access
and the material passage of time, the FAC still does not contain any allegations that Ms. Sara
Bronfman even knew about the existence of DOS (the enterprise through which much of the
alleged sexual and physical abuse occurred), much less that she participated in those illicit
activities. To the contrary, the FAC acknowledges, as it must, that only “First Line Masters”
knew about DOS, and makes clear that Ms. Sara Bronfman was not a member of that group. See
FAC ¶ 19. Likewise, the FAC makes clear that Ms. Sara Bronfman was not a member of the socalled “Inner Circle.” FAC ¶ 277 n. 9.
For all these reasons, and as briefly detailed below, we respectfully request an
opportunity to file a motion to dismiss the FAC (or any further amended complaint if the Court
permits plaintiffs to file a third complaint in this action) pursuant to Rules 8, 9(b) and 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
THE FAC FAILS TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 8
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) mandates that every civil complaint “must
contain … a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Here, 84 individual plaintiffs collectively filed the FAC, asserting that 12 individual defendants
(plus four corporate defendants) are liable for the harms allegedly inflicted upon plaintiffs by
Keith Raniere and others at NXIVM. What remains missing, however, is any attempt to comply
with Rule 8’s requirement that plaintiffs provide Ms. Sara Bronfman with a “short and plain
statement” claiming that any of the plaintiffs (much less 84 of them) are entitled to relief from
Ms. Sara Bronfman: What wrongs, if any, did Ms. Sara Bronfman visit upon any of these
plaintiffs? When, if at all, did that conduct occur? How, if at all, did Ms. Sara Bronfman harm
any of these plaintiffs? Why, if at all, should Ms. Sara Bronfman bear responsibility for the harm
other individuals may have inflicted upon any of these plaintiffs?
Notwithstanding its epic length — clocking in at 1,020-paragraphs spread across 217-
pages — the FAC conspicuously fails to answer any of the questions required by Rule 8. To the
contrary, the FAC uses its many pages to mask the absence of substantive allegations of
wrongdoing on the part of Ms. Sara Bronfman. Thus, the FAC often indiscriminately sweeps all
of the defendants together under the defective (and undefined) moniker “Defendants” and
repeatedly makes allegations that obviously do not pertain to Ms. Sara Bronfman. See Atuahene
v. City of Hartford, 10 F. App’x 33, 34 (2d Cir. 2001) (Summary order) (“By lumping all the
defendants together in each claim and providing no factual basis to distinguish their conduct,
[plaintiff’s] complaint failed to satisfy [Rule 8’s] minimum standard . . .”); Gillespie v. St. Regis
Residence Club, N.Y. Inc., 343 F. Supp. 3d 332, 352-53 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“[B]lanket assertions
as to all Defendants are not sufficient to state a claim.”). For example, the FAC claims that
“Defendants” committed negligence per se by “branding women’s pubic regions with Raniere’s

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The Honorable Eric Komitee October 29, 2021
3
initials.” FAC ¶ 930. Yet, as plaintiffs are well aware, this allegation cannot possibly pertain to
Ms. Sara Bronfman inasmuch as a full read of the FAC makes clear that she was not involved in
(and was not aware of) this conduct, conduct alleged to have occurred only within DOS. See,
e.g., FAC ¶¶ 34, 816-824.
Likewise, the FAC makes allegations regarding supposed conduct by the “Bronfmans,”
as if two sisters are automatically deemed to have acted as one unit simply because they are
related, notwithstanding the fact that they are, of course, two distinct individuals. See, e.g., FAC
¶¶ 707, 708 (referring to alleged conduct by the “Bronfmans”); id. ¶¶ 705, 715 (referring to
purported non-profit funding provided by “the sisters” or “the Bronfman sisters”).
In addition to its impermissible group pleading of defendants, the FAC employs the same
stratagem with the plaintiffs. To take just one egregious example: In Count III, the FAC asserts
a putative cause of action for human trafficking under 18 U.S.C. § 1595. Incredibly, the FAC
purports to bring this cause of action “on behalf of all plaintiffs.” See generally FAC Count III
(B)-(D), ¶¶ 889-906. That makes no sense. As Your Honor observed at the status conference,
the amended complaint asserts claims on behalf of at least two distinct types of plaintiffs,
including (a) individuals who were allegedly subjected to sexual, physical or psychological
abuse by individuals associated with NXIVM, and (b) individuals who appear to claim that they
suffered damages in connection with their purchases of various NXIVM programs or materials.
Based on the FAC’s own descriptions of the 84 plaintiffs, it is unreasonable — or, more
accurately, frivolous — for plaintiffs to assert that each of the 84 plaintiffs was subjected to
trafficking, much less that each of the 84 plaintiffs somehow has a colorable trafficking claim
against Ms. Sara Bronfman.
Further illustrating the FAC’s multiple, fatal defects, we review the example of John Doe
21. The FAC’s only factual allegations regarding John Doe 21 are that he is allegedly a resident
of Canada who at some unspecified point in time “enrolled in and paid for NXIVM curriculum.”
FAC ¶ 542. This is the only information we are provided regarding John Doe 21. Yet, on these
limited facts, the FAC declares that, as a result of “Defendants’” conduct, “John Doe 21 was
emotionally and financially harmed.” Id. ¶ 545. It is obvious that, if John Doe 21 was the only
plaintiff in this action, his claims would be swiftly dismissed inasmuch as “enroll[ing] and
pa[ying] for NXIVM curriculum” does not provide a “short and plain statement” showing that he
is entitled to relief as against Ms. Sara Bronfman. Id. ¶ 542. Nothing in the law gives John Doe
21 a free pass simply because he is merely one of a larger group of 84 plaintiffs. Critically, John
Doe 21 is not an isolated example of a plaintiff who must be dismissed because we are given no
meaningful facts regarding the individual’s claims. There are over 50 plaintiffs in this action for
whom the FAC likewise provides the same limited information (or non-information). All of
these plaintiffs must be dismissed. See Franzone v. City of N.Y., 2015 WL 2139121, at *7
(E.D.N.Y. May 4, 2015) (dismissing complaint that failed to “explain[ ] the role, if any,” one of
the plaintiffs “played in relevant events.”).
In sum, for these reasons — which merely scratch the surface of the FAC’s failure to
comply with Rule 8 — the FAC must be dismissed as against Ms. Sara Bronfman.

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The Honorable Eric Komitee October 29, 2021

THE FAC MUST BE DISMISSED UNDER RULE 12(B)(6)
The FAC names Ms. Sara Bronfman as a defendant in seven of its 16 counts. We seek
the Court’s leave to move to dismiss these seven counts against Ms. Sara Bronfman. We do so
as follows.
The Statute of Limitations Bars Many of Plaintiffs’ Claims. As an initial matter, the
statutes of limitations on many of plaintiffs’ claims have long expired. For the majority of
plaintiffs, as noted above, the FAC disingenuously fails to provide any dates or time-periods
whatsoever — or even years or decades — as to when the conduct at issue occurred. Given that
the complained-of conduct at NXIVM occurred over a decades-long period, it is highly likely
that the applicable limitations periods for claims asserted by many of the 84 plaintiffs ran out
long ago. For this reason, too, in any amended pleading, plaintiffs should be required to state
when the relevant conduct occurred for each individual plaintiff. Dallas v. Vosburgh, 2019 WL
4573743, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2019) (When the “[p]laintiff neither explains when the
claims accrued. . .nor provides a date as to when they accrued. . .[the] [p]laintiff has not carried
his burden. . . .”).
RICO Claims. In Counts I and II, the FAC purports to assert claims for RICO and RICO
conspiracy against all individual defendants on behalf of all 84 plaintiffs. FAC ¶¶ 859-878.
Plaintiffs fall far short of satisfying the high burden necessary to allege a RICO claim. See, e.g.,
Targum v. Citrin Cooperman & Co., 2013 WL 6087400, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2013) (“A
plaintiff’s burden is high when pleading RICO allegations.”). The FAC fails to allege that Ms.
Sara Bronfman, through the commission of two or more predicate acts constituting a pattern of
racketeering activity, participated in a RICO enterprise. The FAC’s only allegation of conduct
by Ms. Sara Bronfman that could conceivably constitute a predicate act is the false allegation
that “[i]n the days leading up to the trial [of Keith Raniere], Defendant Sara Bronfman and her
husband, Basit Igtet, attempted to obstruct or interfere with the trial by employing false pretenses
and promises of money to entice a critical witness, [a witness by the name of] Adrian, to leave
the United States and remain outside of it during Raniere’s criminal trial. The witness refused to
comply with Sara Bronfman’s scheme.” FAC ¶¶ 855. Even putting aside the reality that this
allegation is false, and further putting aside that there is no private cause of action under US law
for attempted obstruction of justice, and further putting aside that the Government has — most
tellingly — not charged Ms. Sara Bronfman with this fanciful charge, it would still leave
plaintiffs with (at most) a single alleged predicate act. Two predicate acts are, of course,
required to state a claim for RICO. The FAC likewise fails to adequately allege the other
elements of a RICO violation. Plaintiffs’ claim for RICO conspiracy must similarly be
dismissed because the FAC fails to factually allege that Ms. Sara Bronfman “agreed with at least
one other entity to commit a substantive RICO offense.” Crawford v. Franklin Credit Mgmt.
Co., 758 F.3d 473, 487 (2d Cir. 2014).
Sex Trafficking. In Count III, the FAC purports to assert certain trafficking claims on
behalf of all plaintiffs under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (the
“TVPRA”) against all defendants in respect of forced labor, human trafficking and peonage.
FAC ¶¶ 879-906. These highly defamatory claims fail as against Ms. Sara Bronfman for several
reasons. First, the TVPRA provides a private cause of action only to “a victim of a violation of”

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The Honorable Eric Komitee October 29, 2021

the TVPRA. See 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). As noted above, the FAC does not plausibly allege that
all 84 plaintiffs were trafficking victims. Second, the FAC does not adequately plead — either
with or without the heightened particularity mandated by Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) — each of the
elements necessary to state a claim under the TVPRA. In other words, the FAC does not plead
that Ms. Sara Bronfman knowingly (i) participated in a trafficking venture, (ii) benefited from
any (non-existent) participation in such a venture, or (iii) knew or should have known the venture
was engaged in a violation of the TVPRA. See 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). To the contrary, the FAC is
devoid of any allegations suggesting that Ms. Sara Bronfman had any knowledge of or benefited
in any way from violations of the TVPRA.
Negligence Per Se. In Count IV, the FAC purports to assert a claim for negligence per se
on behalf of all plaintiffs. FAC ¶¶ 912-932. In this count, plaintiffs seek to hold all defendants
liable for negligence per se predicated on the alleged violation of N.Y. Education Law § 6512
(“Section 6512”), which makes it a felony to engage in the unauthorized practice of psychology,
psychoanalysis or mental health counseling, or to aid and abet another person in the foregoing.
This count — which never mentions Ms. Sara Bronfman by name — fails for several reasons.
First, to state a claim for negligence per se, a plaintiff must allege a “violation of a State statute
that imposes a specific duty.” Cretcher v. U.S. Bank N.A., 2021 WL 1062057, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 19, 2021). In turn, for a state statute to impose a duty of care, a private cause of action
must exist under that statute. Cretcher, 2021 WL 1062057, at *3-4. Here, because Section 6512
does not contain any express or implied private cause of action, the FAC fails to adequately
allege a claim for negligence per se against Ms. Sara Bronfman. Moreover, this count also fails
for the additional, independently-sufficient reason that the FAC does not factually allege that Ms.
Sara Bronfman (or any alleged violation on her part of Section 6512) proximately caused injury
to any of the 84 plaintiffs, let alone every one of the plaintiffs.
Gross Negligence. In Count X, the FAC purports to assert a claim for gross negligence
(and possibly recklessness) against five of the defendants (including Ms. Sara Bronfman) on
behalf of Jane Does 20-22. FAC ¶¶ 965-971. In particular, plaintiffs claim that Ms. Sara
Bronfman acted with gross negligence and recklessness by failing “to supervise [d]efendants
[Brandon] Porter and Nancy Salzman’s treatment of Jane Doe 20, Jane Doe 21 and Jane Doe
22.” FAC ¶ 969. This claim fails for multiple reasons. As an initial matter, absent a special
relationship, an individual has no duty to control or supervise the conduct of another person so as
to prevent such other person from harming others. Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc., 2021 WL 3193166,
at *10 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2021). Here, the FAC asserts that such a duty existed because Ms.
Sara Bronfman supposedly founded or funded Ethical Science Foundation, wherein defendants
Porter and Nancy Salzman allegedly performed the treatments at issue. FAC ¶ 966. Such
funding or sponsorship, even if it occurred, does not suffice to create the requisite duty.
Moreover, even if a special duty did exist (it did not), there are no factual allegations suggesting
that Ms. Sara Bronfman breached such a duty. See D’Amico v. Waste Mgmt. of N.Y., LLC, 2019
WL 1332575, at *8-9 (W.D.N.Y. March 25, 2019) (recklessness in the context of a gross
negligence claim requires “an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, such that
the danger was either known to the defendant or so obvious that the defendant must have been
aware of it.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

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The Honorable Eric Komitee October 29, 2021

Aiding and Abetting. In Count IX, the FAC purports to assert a claim for aiding and
abetting with respect to unauthorized human research against various individual defendants
(including Ms. Sara Bronfman) on behalf of five individual plaintiffs. FAC ¶¶ 956-964. In this
count, plaintiffs seek to hold Ms. Sara Bronfman responsible for “aiding and abetting” defendant
Porter in his alleged conduct of unauthorized human research. FAC ¶¶ 962, 964. This claim
must be dismissed because the FAC does not allege any facts suggesting that Ms. Sara Bronfman
had any knowledge whatsoever of defendant Porter’s alleged misdeeds. See Glob. Enter. Grp.
Holding, S.A. v. Ottimo, 2010 WL 11629556, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. June 8, 2010) (dismissing aiding
and abetting claim for alleging only “in conclusory terms” that the defendant “had actual
knowledge”). This claim also fails for the independent reason that the FAC fails to plausibly
allege facts suggesting that Ms. Sara Bronfman provided substantial assistance to defendant
Porter in the commission of his alleged misdeeds. See Goldberg v. UBS AG, 660 F. Supp. 2d
410, 425-26 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (dismissing aiding and abetting claim for failure to adequately
plead facts showing substantial assistance).
Abuse of Process. In Count V, the FAC purports to assert a claim for malicious abuse of
legal process against certain individual defendants (including Ms. Sara Bronfman) on behalf of
eight individual plaintiffs. FAC ¶¶ 933-939. The plaintiffs’ claims center on the commencement
of largely unidentified “meritless and frivolous civil actions” that lacked “probable cause” (FAC
¶ 934), as well as the alleged instigation of various criminal investigations (FAC ¶ 936). These
claims fail for several reasons. First, a claim for malicious abuse of process requires that a
defendant have employed legal process, but the only action plaintiffs attribute to Ms. Sara
Bronfman in connection with their claims is that she purportedly provided financial support to
the alleged legal actions. See Cargill Soluciones Empresariales, S.A. de C.V., SOFOM, E.N.R. v.
Desarrolladora Farallon S. de R.L. de C.V., 2017 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2967, at *25-26 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. Cty. July 21, 2017) (denying leave to amend to add abuse of process claim because plaintiff
“cite[d] no authority for the proposition that one who provides litigation funding for a baseless
lawsuit may personally face liability, whether under a tortious interference, abuse of process, or
malicious prosecution cause of action.”). Even if plaintiffs had alleged that Ms. Sara Bronfman
had taken a more active role and filed lawsuits, the filing of lawsuits — even frivolous lawsuits
— cannot serve as the basis for an abuse of process claim. Manhattan Enter. Grp. v. Higgins,
816 F. App’x 512, 514 (2d Cir. 2020) (complaint was correctly dismissed “insofar as it was
predicated upon the filing of lawsuits” alleged to be “duplicative, frivolous, and malicious”).
* * *
In conclusion, Ms. Sara Bronfman should not have been named as a defendant in this
lawsuit. We thus respectfully request an opportunity to file a motion to dismiss the FAC. In the
event plaintiffs file a further amended complaint naming Ms. Sara Bronfman, we respectfully
request an opportunity to file a motion to dismiss that complaint as well.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ James D. Wareham
James D. Wareham (pro hac vice)

6

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 that on October
29, 2021 I served upon parties of record, by ECF filing, and caused to be served upon Dr.
Brandon Porter and Dr. Danielle Roberts, by email at brandonporter00485@gmail.com and
Drdanielledo@gmail.com, respectively, a true copy of the attached letter.
Dated: Washington, DC
October 29, 2021
/s/ James D. Wareham
James D. Wareham

Email: nglazer@kohnswift.com
October 29, 2021

Via Electronic Filing

Honorable Eric R. Komitee United States District Court
Eastern District of New York 225 Cadman Plaza East Courtroom: 6G North Brooklyn, New York 11201

Re: Edmondson, et al. v Raniere, et al.

Dear Judge Komitee:
We write on behalf of Plaintiffs in this action to request the Court’s authorization to issue a non-party subpoena prior to the parties’ Rule 26(f) conference and the Court’s adoption of a discovery plan, directed to an individual whom we believe to have potentially significant and sensitive evidence relevant to claims asserted by Plaintiffs.1 As we explained at the status conference, our concern with this individual is the high risk that if this evidence is not preserved, it may be transferred to others or destroyed. As directed by the Court, we set forth below additional information that supports this narrow request.

The individual is Suneel Chakravorty, a former NXIVM member and associate of Defendant Keith Raniere. Mr. Chakravorty has publicly claimed to be working on Raniere’s behalf in the criminal case, United States v. Raniere. Among other things, it has been reported that Mr. Chakravorty, who is not an attorney, has been directing efforts to prepare and file on behalf of Raniere a motion for a new trial under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33, based on what he alleges is proof that the FBI tampered with evidence introduced at trial to support three of the racketeering predicates: two violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2251, exploitation of a child, and one violation of 18

1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(d)(1) permits a party to take discovery prior to the Rule 26(f) conference
“when authorized . . . by court order.” In deciding whether to authorize the requested discovery, the Court should consider the “reasonableness of the request in light of all the surrounding circumstances.” Ayash v. Bank Al- Medina, 233 F.R.D. 325, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

U.S.C. § 2252, possession of child pornography.[1] Those predicates concerned lewd photos taken by Raniere in 2005 of a then-fifteen-year-old Jane Doe victim who is a Plaintiff in this action, Camila.[2] He purports to have hired experts who will opine that the metadata associated with these files was altered to reflect a 2005 creation date when they were allegedly created much later. The hard drive on which these files were stored is the subject of an inquiry by Judge Garaufis into whether the protective order he issued in the criminal proceeding has been violated.

Plaintiffs’ request with respect to Mr. Chakravorty concerns materials that are not within the scope of Judge Garaufis’s inquiry but are of equally serious concern: nude images of Camila taken when she was an adult and a DOS “slave”.[3] Such images were kept as “collateral,” meant to enforce slaves’ compliance with all demands of their “masters,” and to ensure their continued silence about DOS and what was taking place within the group. It is blackmail material, which the jury concluded was used to extort slaves (the use of collateral formed the basis for racketeering predicate ten, state law extortion). DOS collateral was compiled and stored on hard drives, including drives possessed by a defendant in this action, Nicole Clyne, another vocal advocate for Raniere who Plaintiffs have learned currently resides with Mr. Chakravorty.

We were recently informed that Mr. Chakravorty shared these images of Camila with one or more third parties. He apparently shared these images because they relate to other evidence of the child exploitation and child pornography predicates underlying Raniere’s racketeering conviction. The prosecution also presented to the jury later-dated photographs of Camila that showed a surgical scar on her abdomen from an appendectomy performed when she was sixteen years old. This evidence supported the prosecution’s contention that the lewd images of Camila were taken when she was younger than sixteen because those images did not show an abdominal scar. Mr. Chakravorty claims that the images he has shared do not show the scar, which he asserts somehow proves that the government may have altered the photos introduced at trial.

We do not know how Mr. Chakravorty obtained these images. Nor do we know if he has, or has knowledge of the whereabouts of, other DOS collateral. The fact that he is co-habiting with Defendant Clyne (who was a DOS “master”) both explains how he obtained the images he shared with others and raises the concern that he may have or have access to other collateral. If this public supporter of Raniere possesses and is sharing images of DOS collateral with others, it is of grave concern. Not only is this collateral significant evidence in this action, but the mere possibility of its dissemination is a continual source of anxiety and trauma for all DOS victims, including Plaintiffs. We respectfully submit that these circumstances warrant prompt action, because (among other things) the proposed discovery may provide a basis for injunctive relief regarding the storage, safeguarding and ultimate disposition of this highly sensitive
material. This request for authorization to take narrowly tailored non-party discovery is not only reasonable in light of all the circumstances, but compelling.

[1] The jury found that Raniere committed all fourteen charged racketeering predicates.
[2] Until the Court decides whether some Plaintiffs will be able to proceed using first names or pseudonyms, which Plaintiffs hope to resolve in a meet and confer with Defendants, Plaintiffs are endeavoring to follow the protocol for identifying victims established by Judge Garaufis in the criminal proceeding. Because she has been identified by her first name in the public record, Camila is identified in the same manner in this action.
[3] According to the government, these images were not discovery materials covered by the protective order in the criminal case. For this reason, these images are beyond the scope of Judge Garaufis’ current inquiry.

Specifically, Plaintiffs request leave of the Court to issue to and serve upon Mr.
Chakravorty a non-party subpoena demanding the following: (1) copies of all images of Camila and any other woman who was ever a member of DOS that are in his possession, custody or control; (2) a bit-for-bit copy of any computer or storage device in his possession, custody or control that contains or ever contained such images; (3) identification of every cloud storage service he has ever utilized or had access to in which such images are or have ever been stored;
(4) every communication concerning such images; and (5) a sworn affidavit identifying (i) each and every person who he has shown, transferred or transmitted any copy of any such image, specifying the means by which he showed, transferred or transmitted such image to such person,
(ii) each and every person who has shown, transferred or transmitted to him any copy of any such image, specifying the means by which such person showed, transferred or transmitted such image to him, and (iii) each and every person who he knows or has reason to believe has any such images in their possession, custody or control, specifying the location of such images and the media on which such images are stored. We further request that access to this discovery be restricted to Plaintiffs and Mr. Chakravorty until such time as the Court issues an appropriate protective order governing the handling of confidential and highly confidential information.

Respectfully Submitted,

Neil L. Glazer
NLG/csm

cc: All counsel via ECF